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A Symposium on the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court National Security Panel THE REHNQUIST COURT’S NONINTERFERENCE WITH THEGUARDIANS OF NATIONAL SECURITY Gregory E. Maggs* 
Introduction The “Rehnquist Court” came into existence in September 1986 whenPresident Ronald Reagan and the Senate elevated William H. Rehnquistfrom his position as an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court toChief Justice of the United States. The era of the Rehnquist Court came toa close in September 2005 with the sad news of Chief Justice Rehnquist’sdeath. In this nineteen-year period, the Supreme Court decided many importantnational security cases. The term “national security” generally refers to thesafety of the U.S. government, territory, and people from external threats.1When the Rehnquist Court initially began, the Cold War had not ended, andthe United States was mostly concerned with risks posed by the communistSoviet Union.2  But at least since 2001, the nation has given most of its
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3 See B ureau of Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Iran, North KoreaThreaten to Develop, Spread Nuclear W eapons: Nuclear Proliferation Second Onlyto Terrorism as Danger to United States, W ash. File, Mar. 1, 2006 , http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfi le-english&y=2006&m=March&x=20060301173919idybeekcm0.1129419 [hereinafter State DepartmentInformation Release]. 4 See H amdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U .S. 507, 509 (2004). 5 See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 659 (1989).6 See W ebster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 598-99 (1988). 7 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000). 8 William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime(1998). 
attention to threats from international terrorism and to the possibility thatweapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of rogue nations.3 The Supreme Court does not decide in the first instance what to doabout national security. The Rehnquist Court, for example, never had todetermine whether the United States was following the right strategy in theCold War, how to respond to North Korea’s nuclear program, or whatmeasures to take against international terrorism. On the contrary, what ismost commonly litigated in the Supreme Court is usually one or more stepsremoved*1123 from these inherently political, diplomatic, and strategicquestions. As this Essay will show, the Supreme Court usually is limited toreviewing the legality of governmental actions taken either in preparationfor national security threats or in response to them. For example, the Courthas had to decide whether the military may detain terrorists,4  whether theDepartment of Transportation may require drug testing for customsofficials,5  whether the decision of the Director of the Central IntelligenceAgency to dismiss certain employees who might pose security risks isjudicially reviewable,6  and whether the states (as opposed to the federalgovernment) may enact legislation to influence foreign policy.7 This Essay describes numerous important national security cases thatthe Supreme Court decided between 1986 and 2005. Giving attention tothese national security cases at this time is fitting because the United Statesis now engaged in armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and is fightingterrorism both at home and in other places around the world. In addition,Chief Justice Rehnquist had a special interest in the Supreme Court’s rolein national security matters: in 1998, he wrote a comprehensive book calledAll the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime.8  In this work, hediscussed the tensions between national security and individual rights
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9 See id . 10 See infra Part II.A.2. (discussing how noninterference in areas of nationalsecurity may have kep t the Court out of the kinds of controversies created by theCourt’s extensive involvement in public safety issues like criminal procedure, thedeath penalty, and prisoners’ rights). 11 See infra Part II.A.2. 
during times of war.9  Although the book dealt almost exclusively withcases decided before 1986, as this Essay will show, Chief Justice Rehn-quist’s observations and analysis remain relevant today. Based on an examination of the Rehnquist Court’s national securitycases, this Essay makes three claims. The first claim is that the RehnquistCourt generally did not interfere with the governmental units that serve asthe guardians of national security. These guardians include the Presidentand various federal departments and agencies such as the Department ofDefense (“DOD”), the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), the FederalBureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and others. The Rehnquist Court almostalways rejected challenges to governmental actions taken by theseguardians of national security when the guardians justified the actionsbased on the need to protect the United States from external threats. The second claim is that the Rehnquist Court’s hands-off approachgenerally had favorable consequences. It promoted national security byleaving the subject to the governmental units most competent to address thetopic. The Rehnquist Court’s practice of noninterference also kept theCourt out of the kinds of controversies that in other areas of the law haveembroiled the Court in political disputes that have damaged its reputation.10Although the *1124 national security policies of the United States havemany critics, few of these critics fault the Supreme Court for the content ofthese policies; instead, they sensibly assign responsibility for the policiesto the political branches that created them.11  Fortunately, the institutionalbenefits to the Supreme Court from its practice of noninterference came atlittle cost. Although a deferential approach in national security cases mighthave led to significant governmental abuses, that potential consequencedoes not appear to have occurred during the past nineteen years. The third claim is that the Rehnquist Court’s principal legacy to theRoberts Court is one of experience. The Rehnquist Court did not establisha generalized and binding doctrine of noninterference that the RobertsCourt must follow. Instead, in case after case, the Rehnquist Court simplyfound some way to defer to or otherwise uphold governmental choices.Although the Roberts Court now has considerable freedom to choose
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12 John Doe Agency v. John D oe Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989). 13 See id . at 148-49 & 148 n.1. 14 Id. at 149; see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §  552  (2000). 15 See John D oe Agency, 493 U.S. at 149-50; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(“This section does not apply to matters that are--...(7) records or informationcompiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the productionof such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expectedto interfere with enforcement proceedings...[or] (D) could reasonably be expectedto disclose...in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal lawenforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agencyconducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, informationfurnished by a confidential source....”) . 
another approach, it has the benefit of knowing that the Rehnquist Court’spractice served both the Court and the nation very well. I. Guardians of National Security and How They Fared The United States has many guardians of national security--agencies andother political entities that have the responsibility of keeping the countrysafe. These guardians include federal law enforcement agencies, the armedforces, the intelligence services, and other governmental units. A usefulway to appreciate the breadth and consistency of the Rehnquist Court’spractice in national security matters is to look at how the Court treatedthese various guardians. The Court’s cases reveal that, regardless of thegovernmental agency or legal issue involved, the Rehnquist Court almostalways upheld actions taken in the name of national security. Or to put itanother way, the Rehnquist Court generally followed a practice ofnoninterference in national security matters. A. The FBI The FBI has domestic counterterrorism and counterespionage responsi-bilities and has often become involved in national security programs. Onesignificant Rehnquist Court decision concerning the actions of the FBI wasJohn Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,12  decided in 1989. In that case, theFBI was investigating potential fraud by a defense contractor in a secretmilitary program.13  In an apparent attempt to discover what the investiga-tors knew and did not know, the contractor requested documents from theFBI under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).14  But the FBIrefused to turn over the documents, citing an exception that allowed it tokeep records compiled for law enforcement purposes, including thoseinvolving national security investigations.15  In an opinion by JusticeBlackmun (joined by five others, *1125 including Chief Justice Rehnquist),
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 5
16 See John D oe Agency, 493 U.S. at 147 , 155. 17 See Gregory E. M aggs, Terrorism and the Law: Cases and Materials 124(2005). 18 Id. at 127-28. 19 Id. at 125-26. 20 Id. at 125. 21 Official expressions of the government’s policy and its rationale appear indeclarations by James S. Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism and Violent CrimeSection of the U.S. Department of Justice, and Dale L. Watson, the FBI’s ExecutiveAssistant Director for Counterterrorism. These declarations are quoted in Brief forthe Respondent in Opposition at 6-7, Ctr. for Nat’l Security Studies v. Dep’t ofJustice, 540 U.S. 1104 (2005) (No . 03-472), available at 2003 W L 22989100 . 22 Ctr. for Nat’l Security Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.2003). 23 Id. at 920. 24 Id. at 920-21. 25 Id. 
the Supreme Court held that the FBI could retain the requested records,even though the government had not originally compiled the records forlaw enforcement purposes.16 The John Doe case has significance because the holding may permit theFBI and other governmental agencies to use the “compiled for” exceptionin FOIA to make otherwise nonsecret information unobtainable on groundsof national security. For example, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, theUnited States sought to use immigration laws to thwart further terroristactions.17  The federal government detained hundreds of aliens, mostly fromthe Middle East, for minor immigration violations.18  Few if any of thesealiens actually had ties to terrorism.19  And in other circumstances, thegovernment probably would not have arrested them. 20 A factor making theprogram especially controversial was that the government refused to makea list of the detainees’ names known to the public, fearing that such a listmight reveal to terrorist organizations which of their members thegovernment had arrested and which it had not.21 In Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department ofJustice,22  a private organization challenged this nondisclosure policy.23  Itmade a FOIA request asking for the names of the persons detained onimmigration charges.24  The government, invoking the “compiled for lawenforcement” exception, argued that it did not have to release the names.25The D.C. Circuit upheld the government’s position, concluding that JohnDoe Agency and other decisions permitted the government to withhold the
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND NATIONAL SECURITY6
26 Id. at 925-26. 27 Id. at 926 (“Plaintiffs are seeking a comprehensive listing of individualsdetained during the post-September 11 investigation. The names have beencompiled for the ‘law enforcement purpose’ of successfully prosecuting theterrorism investigation. As compiled, they constitute a comprehensive diagram ofthe law enforcement investigation after September 11. Clearly this is informationcompiled for law enforcement purposes.”  (quoting 5 U.S.C. §  552(b)(7)(A))). 28 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 29 Id. at 262. 30 Id. at 263. 31 Id. 32 Id. at 261, 274-75. 33 Id. at 274-75. 34 Id. at 266. 
names.26  Even though the individual names by themselves were not secret,the collection of the names fit within the FOIA’s “compiled for lawenforcement” exception.27 *1126 B. Drug Enforcement Administration For many years, the United States has waged an international campaignagainst illegal drugs. Another guardian of national security, and oneengaged in this campaign, is the Drug Enforcement Administration(“DEA”). In 1990, the Rehnquist Court decided an important case relatedto the DEA and the war on drugs called United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.28  In that case, DEA agents assisted Mexican authorities insearching the Mexican home of Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexicancitizen suspected of illegal narcotics activities.29  When the U.S. govern-ment later tried Verdugo-Urquidez in federal court in California, Verdugo-Urquidez objected to the introduction of evidence obtained from hishome.30  He asserted that the search had violated the Fourth Amendmentbecause the DEA had not obtained a warrant.31 The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,rejected Verdugo-Urquidez’s argument.32  It held that the Fourth Amend-ment did not apply to the search of an alien’s residence outside the UnitedStates.33  The Court explained: The available historical data show . . . that the purpose of the FourthAmendment was to protect the people of the United States againstarbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggestedthat the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the FederalGovernment against aliens outside of the United States territory.34
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35 See id . at 274-75. 36 The Court explained:  The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals would apply not only to lawenforcement operations abroad, but also to  other foreign policy operations whichmight result in ‘searches or seizures.’ The United States frequently employs ArmedForces outside this country...for the protection of American citizens or nationalsecurity.... Application of the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances couldsignificantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreignsituations involving our national interest. W ere respondent to prevail, aliens withno attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedyclaimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in internationalwaters. Id. at 273-74. 37 See id . 38 United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 39 Id. at 171-72. 
The Court therefore concluded that the United States could introduceevidence obtained from the Mexican home in its prosecution.35 The Verdugo-Urquidez decision has far-reaching national securityimplications. If the Rehnquist Court had reached a different conclusion, theFourth Amendment might limit the ability of the federal government topractice espionage against our foreign enemies. But the CIA, NationalSecurity Agency (“NSA”), and military intelligence agencies presumablyconduct searches and wiretaps in foreign countries without obtaining awarrant.36  Although*1127 these agencies generally do not seek to use theinformation that they collect as evidence in court, they still could faceliability or other sanctions for violating the Fourth Amendment if the Courthad held that the Amendment’s prohibitions apply outside of the UnitedStates.37 The Verdugo-Urquidez decision also is playing a key role in litigationarising out of the United States’ War on Terror. The federal courts, forexample, have relied on the precedent in two cases stemming from alQaeda’s 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Onedecision, styled United States v. Bin Laden 38 in reference to the master-mind of the conspiracy, concerned the indictment of some of the suspectsin the bombing. Agents of the United States had questioned these suspectsin Africa.39  The trial court had to determine, on the basis of the Verdugo-
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND NATIONAL SECURITY8
40 See id . at 181-82 (comparing the extraterritorial application of the FifthAmendment and Fourth Amendment based on the reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez);see also  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 41 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004).42 See id . at 1349. 43 Id. at 1348-49. 44 Id. at 1352  (concluding that the “takings claim at bottom presents anonjusticiable political question,” rendering it unnecessary to determine whether theVerdugo-Urquidez decision also blocked the claim). 45 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F . Supp. 2d  443  (D.D .C. 2005). 46 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005). 47 Compare Guantanamo, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 463-64 (distinguishing Verdugo-Urquidez and holding that the detainees have a right to due process under the FifthAmendment), with Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (relying on Verdugo-Urquidez, among other decisions, in holding that nonresident aliens captured anddetained outside the United States do  not have constitutional rights). 
Urquidez decision, the extent to which the suspects were entitled to thebenefits of the Miranda rule regarding confessions.40 The other decision, El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. UnitedStates,41  concerned the consequences of a military action that the UnitedStates took following the bombings of U.S. embassies abroad. To strikeback at al Qaeda, the United States fired missiles at a pharmaceutical plantin Sudan that it believed was making chemical weapons for bin Laden.42The owner of the plant, who denied any link to al Qaeda, subsequently suedthe U.S. government for the taking of his property.43  The U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to determine, among otherissues, whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez barredclaims for compensation for property taken outside of the United States.44In addition, the Verdugo-Urquidez decision has come up in lower courtlitigation concerning detainees whom the United States captured whenfighting in Afghanistan and now holds at the U.S. Naval Base in Guan-tánamo Bay, Cuba. The decisions in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases45and Khalid v. Bush46 disagreed about whether detainees at Guantanamohave a right to *1128 due process under the Fifth Amendment.47  Becauseof this division, more litigation on this subject appears likely. C. CIA, NSA, and Other Intelligence Agencies The CIA and the NSA also have responsibility for protecting the nationfrom external threats. These agencies collectively had several cases beforethe Supreme Court. Much like the situation for other government entities,
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48 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 49 Id. at 595. 50 This Essay is about the legacy of the Rehnquist Court in national securitycases generally, not just about the legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist himself. Thebroader focus is appropriate because the Chief Justice has only one vote, the sameas each of the Associate Justices, and thus cannot by himself or herself set theCourt’s jurisprudential path. Yet, the Chief Justice does have a special power worthnoting. When in the majority, the Chief Justice can decide to write the majorityopinion himself or herself or instead decide to assign the opinion to someone elsein the majority who may have very closely aligned views. What the majorityopinion says (or  does not say) may influence subsequent decisions. See BarryFriedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 291-92 (2005)(“[T]he Chief Justice assigns the opin ion if he is in the majority; otherwise thesenior associate Justice assigns. Empirical work suggests that the initial opinionassignee often ends up writing the opinion for the Court and that most members ofthe majority coalition join without requesting any changes, making the initialassignment incredibly important as to the direction the  law will take.”). 51 Webster, 486  U.S. at 594 , 601. 52 Id. at 604-05. 53 Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1324  (D.C. Cir. 1993). 54 Id. (quotation omitted). 55 Doe v. W oolsey, 510 U.S. 928 (1993). 56 See Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 95 (1988) (considering a challenge to thedischarge of an NSA employee who admitted having homosexual relationships withforeign nationals); Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526-27 (1988)
when these agencies defended their actions based on national security, theRehnquist Court generally did not interfere. In Webster v. Doe,48  the CIA discharged an employee because itdetermined that his homosexuality posed a security risk.49  The SupremeCourt, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,50  concluded that theemployee had no administrative remedies under any statute.51  The Courtremanded the case for consideration of the employee’s constitutionalclaim.52  Following remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuitconsidered the constitutional question.53  The court concluded that theCIA’s action did not violate the guarantee of equal protection becauseterminating the employee was “rationally related to the legitimategovernment security interest in collecting foreign intelligence andprotecting the nation’s secrets.” 54 The Supreme Court denied the em-ployee’s petition for review.55  In the same year, the Rehnquist Courtsimilarly rejected administrative challenges to adverse personnel actionstaken by NSA and the Department of the Navy against employees whomthese agencies deemed to present security risks.56 
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(holding that the M erit Systems Protection Board could not review the revocationof a civilian employee’s security clearance). 57 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U .S. 403 (2002). 58 See id . at 406 . 59 See id . at 408 . 60 Id. at 415. 61 Id. 62 Id. at 417. 63 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U .S. 1 (2005). 64 See id . at 4. 65 Id. at 8. 
*1129 A more recent case, Christopher v. Harbury,57  was about denyinga concerned citizen access to classified information. That case involvedJennifer Harbury, the American widow of a Guatemalan dissident who diedin custody of the Guatemalan Army.58  She sued the CIA, State Department,and National Security Council, and officials of each agency, alleging thatthey had withheld information about her husband and thus prevented herfrom bringing a lawsuit to save him.59 The Supreme Court denied relief.60  It held that Harbury failed to statea claim of denial of access to the courts because she had not identified whatcause of action she might have brought.61  The Court also emphasized thatfurther judicial inquiry would raise concerns for the separation of powersbecause it would encroach on diplomatic matters committed to otherbranches.62  The Court thus did not interfere with the intelligence agencies’withholding of the information. Another recent decision, Tenet v. Doe,63  concerned the rights ofinformants for the CIA. Two foreign nationals sued the Director of the CIA,claiming that he had broken a promise to provide them with financialsupport in exchange for their espionage work.64  The Supreme Court, in anopinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that public policy barredthe courts from hearing suits against the government based on covertespionage agreements.65  The CIA thus was free to not keep any promisesof support that it might have made. In each of these cases, the Court declined to interfere with actions takenby federal intelligence agencies in the name of national security. Howimportant are these cases? An observer might be tempted to dismiss themas not very significant from a national security law perspective. If thegovernment had lost each of these cases, the nation probably would nothave faced much increased peril. The apparent dangers simply were not thatgreat. 
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66 See U .S. Customs and B order Prot., U.S. Customs Service--Over 200 Yearsof History, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/too lbox/about/history/history.xml (lastvisited June 11, 2006) (describing the mission of the Customs Service, whichprominently includes “[i]nterdicting and  seizing contraband”). 67 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U .S. 656 (1989). 68 See id . at 665 . 69 Id. at 674. 
But that is not the correct conclusion to draw. These cases clearly wereimportant to the parties and to all persons similarly situated. The loss of ajob to a typical government employee, information about a missing spouse,or payment for potentially dangerous spying are no small matters to theindividuals concerned. Yet the Rehnquist Court still chose not to interfere,even when contrary decisions would have posed little danger to the country.These cases thus strongly illustrate the Court’s preference for not interfer-ing with the guardians of national security. *1130 D. Customs Service The Customs Service also plays a role in protecting the United Statesfrom external threats to its security. A large part of its mission is to preventillegal items from coming across the borders.66  In the course of its work,the Customs Service prevents or fails to prevent weapons or otherdangerous materials from reaching the hands of terrorists or other enemieswho might harm America. The Rehnquist Court did not interfere with the Customs Service’sactions in a major case in which the Customs Service justified the actionson the grounds of national security. In National Treasury Employees Unionv. Von Raab,67  the Court allowed the Customs Service to performsuspicionless drug tests on employees applying for promotion to positionsinvolving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring the carrying of firearms.The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily prohibits thegovernment from making searches (including searches for drugs throughdrug testing) unless the government has some reason to believe that thesearch will yield evidence of wrongdoing.68  But the Court concluded thatthe drug testing by the Customs Service did not violate the FourthAmendment due to “the extraordinary safety and national security hazardsthat would attend the promotion of drug users.”69 The Von Raab decision is now playing an important role in litigationregarding counterterrorism measures. For example, following the bombingattacks on London subways in 2005, New York City instituted a practice
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND NATIONAL SECURITY12
70 See MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM , 2005 WL 3338573(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005). 71 Id. at *1. 72 Id. at *18. 73 Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989). 74 Id. at 155. 75 Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 630, 101Stat. 1329, 1432  (1987). 76 Garkfinkel, 490 U .S. at 158. 77 Id. at 161. 78 Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 732 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1990). 79 Encuentro Del Canto Popular v. Christopher, 930 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Cal.1996). 
of searching containers brought into its subway system.70  In an opinionciting Von Raab eight times, the U.S. District Court for the SouthernDistrict of New York rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to thisprogram. 71 The court found the practice to be “a reasonable method ofdeterring (and detecting) a terrorist bombing of the New York City subwaysystem,” and compared it favorably to the Customs Service’s drug testingprogram upheld by the Rehnquist Court.72 E. State Department The State Department is another guardian of national security, managinginternational relations as a method of protecting the United States. As withother departments and agencies in the federal government, the RehnquistCourt did not interfere with the State Department when it justified itsactions on grounds of national security. In American Foreign Service Ass’nv. *1131 Garfinkel,73  for example, foreign service officers sued to enjointhe State Department from requiring them to sign nondisclosure agree-ments.74  While the litigation was pending in the lower courts, Congresspassed a law supporting the foreign service officers.75 The United Statesargued to the Supreme Court that the statute unconstitutionally intrudedupon executive power “to regulate the disclosure of national securityinformation.”76  Because of the importance of the constitutional questionposed by the new act, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against theState Department and remanded the case.77  On remand, the district courtinterpreted the statute in a way that favored the State Department andavoided any constitutional issue.78  The federal courts thus did not interferewith the State Department’s use of the form. The Garfinkel decision has affected national security in other areas. Forexample, in Encuentro Del Canto Popular v. Christopher,79  a group of
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80 Id. at 1362 . 81 Id. (quoting Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (Oct. 10, 1985)).82 See id. at 1365 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 901 , repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-465, §2205(1), 94 Stat. 2071, 2159-60 (1980)). 83 Id. 84 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 85 See id . at 366-67. 86 See id . at 367 . 87 Id. at 373-74. 88 Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334 (1990). 
Cuban musicians sought entry into the United States. The State Departmentdenied them visas.80  It based its decision on a presidential proclamationrequiring exclusion of “’individuals who, notwithstanding the type ofpassport that they hold, are considered by the Secretary of State or hisdesignee to be officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or theCommunist Party of Cuba.”’ 81 The sponsors of the musicians argued thata federal statute had overturned the proclamation.82 Following Garfinkel,however, the district court rejected this argument, interpreting the federalstatute in favor of the State Department’s position so as to avoid the“thorny constitutional question whether or to what extent the President’spower over foreign affairs must yield to Congress’ power over immigrationin cases in which both areas are implicated.”83  The State Department thusagain prevailed. F. Federal Government vs. the States The Rehnquist Court’s national security cases did not all involvedisputes between the executive branch and private parties. In Crosby v.National Foreign Trade Council,84  the Court considered the respectiveroles of the federal government and the states. The case arose afterMassachusetts enacted a law designed to put pressure on the repressivegovernment of Burma.85  The law restricted the ability of state agencies topurchase goods or *1132 services from companies that did business withBurma.86  But the Rehnquist Court found the state law preempted by afederal statute, which among other things had sought to give the President“effective discretion . . . to control economic sanctions against Burma.”87The Court thus made clear that the federal government, rather than thestates, is the keeper of national security. The Rehnquist Court also adhered to this approach in a case concerningthe National Guard. In Perpich v. Department of Defense,88  the Minnesotagovernor opposed the federal government’s decision to send the Minnesota
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND NATIONAL SECURITY14
89 Id. at 336-38. 90 Id. at 347 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, which states that Congress may“provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppressInsurrections and repel Invasions,” and id. cl. 16, which states that Congress mayprovide for the “organizing, arming, and disciplining” of the Militia). 91 Id. at 346 (explaining that “under the dual enlistment provisions of the statutethat have been in effect since 1933, a member of the Guard who is ordered to activeduty in the federal service is thereby relieved of his or her status in the State Guardfor the entire period of federal service” (quotation omitted)). 92 Id. at 354-55. 93 The Rehnquist Court decided several cases involving courts-martial inaddition to the ones described above. See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529,531 (2004) (considering whether the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces lackedjurisdiction to enjoin the removal of an airman from the service); Ryder v. UnitedStates, 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995) (deciding a procedural issue concerningAppointments Clause challenges to military judges); Davis v. United States, 512U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (deciding a right-to-counsel issue). 
National Guard to Central America for training.89  He argued that theMilitia Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorized the calling of any kindof state troops to active service only “for three limited purposes that do notencompass either foreign service or nonemergency conditions.”90  But theCourt upheld the federal action; pursuant to a federal statute, all NationalGuardsmen are members not only of their state forces but also of a reservecomponent of the U.S. Army.91  Consequently, the Court concluded, thefederal government has authority to deploy Minnesota National Guardsmenfor training abroad.92 G. The Armed Forces The Rehnquist Court also decided a number of important caseschallenging actions taken by the military. In these cases, the Courtgenerally did not interfere. Even in the few cases when the Rehnquist Courtdid not completely agree with the military’s positions, however, it kept itsintrusion into military activity to a minimum. 1. Courts-Martial Several of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions involved courts-martial.Court-martial cases in lower tribunals often involve criminal prosecutionsconcerning offenses that have little to do with national security. But thecases that came to the Rehnquist Court involved important questions ofexecutive and congressional authority over military matters. In these cases,the Rehnquist Court did not disturb the judgments of other branches of thegovernment. 93 
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94 Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 95 Id. at 436. 96 Id. 97 Id. at 450-51.98 Id. at 441-45 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, which provides Congresswith the power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land andnaval Forces”). 99 O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969) (holding that because theoffenses committed by a U.S. Army sergeant were not service connected, he couldnot be charged  by a court-martial), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S.435  (1987). 100 Solorio, 483 U.S. at 436 (overruling O’Callahan). 101 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). 102 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 103 See W eiss, 510 U.S. at 181; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666. 104 See W eiss, 510 U.S. at 168. 105 See Edmond, 520 U .S. at 653-54. 106 See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 171; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 655-56 (citing U.S. Const.art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which states that the President “shall appoint...all other Officers ofthe United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
*1133 In Solorio v. United States,94  for example, a member of the CoastGuard made a constitutional challenge to the jurisdiction of a court-martialthat tried him for sex offenses allegedly committed against the children ofanother Coast Guardsman. He argued that the court-martial lackedjurisdiction because the charged offenses lacked any “serviceconnection.”95  The Supreme Court disagreed.96  In an opinion written byChief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that a court-martial’s jurisdictiondepends solely on the accused’s status as a member of the armed forces,and not on the character of the offense.97  The Court reasoned that arequirement that the offense have a service connection did not exist inArticle I, Section 8, Clause 14.98 The decision overruled another case,O’Callahan v. Parker,99  decided by the Warren Court seventeen yearsearlier.100 In Weiss v. United States101  and Edmond v. United States,102  theRehnquist Court considered challenges to the appointment process for thetrial and appellate judges involved in courts-martial.103  The appointmentprocess in these cases did not involve the President; instead, the seniorlegal officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force assigned personnel to serveas military judges in their respective services,104  and the Secretary ofTransportation assigned military judges in the Coast Guard.105  The accusedin these cases contended that vesting the task of appointing military judgesin these officials violated the Appointments Clause. 106 The defendants
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which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest theAppointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”). 107 See W eiss, 510 U.S. at 170; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 655-56. 108 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 176. 109 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666. 110 See, e.g., Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,Exec. Order No. 13 ,387 , 70 Fed. Reg. 60 ,697  (Oct. 18, 2005). 111 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U .S. 303 (1998). 112 Id. at 306-07 (quoting Mil. R. Evid. 707(a), which states: “Notwithstandingany other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion ofa polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or takingof a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence”). 113 See id . at 307-08 & 307 n.3. 114 See id . at 309 , 317. 115 Id. at 312. 
argued that only the President could appoint military judges, and that theSenate had to confirm them.107  In Weiss, the Court held that militaryofficers detailed to serve as military judges did not pose a constitutionalproblem; because they had already received commissions as militaryofficers, they did not need an additional appointment to serve as militaryjudges.108  In Edmond, the Court held *1134 that the Secretary of Transpor-tation could appoint civilians to serve as appellate judges on the CoastGuard Court of Criminal Appeals because these appellate judges are“inferior officers” not covered by the Appointments Clause.109 Courts-martial conduct trials according to the Rules for Courts-Martialand the Military Rules of Evidence in the Manual for Courts-Martial, whichthe President promulgates by executive order.110  In two important cases,the Rehnquist Court considered challenges to these rules. In United Statesv. Scheffer,111  the accused challenged a provision in the Military Rules ofEvidence that prohibited the introduction of polygraph evidence.112  Heargued that the prohibition violated the Fifth Amendment requirement ofdue process and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense bypreventing him from introducing exculpatory evidence. 113 But the Courtrejected this argument.114  It held that the President’s rule was “a rationaland proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barringunreliable evidence.”115  The Court thus did not interfere with the Presi-dent’s decision to promulgate the Military Rules of Evidence. 
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116 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 117 Id. at 751. 118 Id. at 754-55. 119 In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Courtheld that death penalty sentencing schemes were unconstitutional in a situationwhere they did not limit discretion sufficiently to prevent the arbitrary or capriciousimposition of capita l punishment. In subsequent cases, the Court ruled that deathpenalty schemes may be constitutional if they require proof of “aggravating factors”that justify imposing the capital punishment instead of a lesser penalty. See, e.g.,Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988). 120 See Loving, 517 U.S. at 751 (describing how the court-martial found, withrespect to the murders of two taxi drivers, “(1) that the premeditated murder of thesecond driver was committed during the course of a robbery, Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 1004(c)(7)(B); (2) that Loving acted as the triggerman in the felonymurder of the first driver, RCM 1004(c)(8); and (3) that Loving, having been foundguilty of the premeditated murder, had committed a second murder...,RCM1004(c)(7)(J)”). 121 See id . at 751-52. 122 Id. at 769-70 (citing 10 U .S.C. §§ 818, 836, 856). 123 See id. at 763-67 (describing the lessons the Framers learned from theEnglish Parliament’s experience in using courts-martial and the subsequent decisionto vest Congress with the power to regulate the  Armed Forces). 124 See id. at 768 (reasoning that “it would be contrary to the respect owed thePresident as Commander in Chief to  hold that he may not be given wide discretionand authority”). 
In Loving v. United States,116  a court-martial sentenced a soldier todeath in connection with murders committed in the course of robberies.117The soldier challenged the death sentence as unconstitutional under theEighth Amendment.118  The Supreme Court had previously ruled that theEighth Amendment permits the imposition of the death penalty for murderonly if the presence of predefined aggravating factors shows a greater levelof culpability.119  In Loving, a court-martial found the presence of threeaggravating factors listed in the Rules for Courts-Martial promulgated bythe President.120  The accused argued that the President lacked the authorityto promulgate*1135 the applicable rules by executive order.121  But theCourt rejected this contention, relying on statutes giving the Presidentauthority to establish procedural rules for courts-martial and to limit thepunishments that courts-martial may impose.122 The Loving case stressed two points. One is that national securityrequires military discipline, which is accomplished through courts-martial.123  The other is that the Court must defer to the President asCommander in Chief in his control of military forces and military policy.124
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125 See U nited States v. Pollard, 416 F.3d 48, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citingseparation of powers principles set forth in Loving), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1590(2006). 126 See U nited States v. M oussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 469 (4th Cir. 2004) (same),cert. denied, 544 U .S. 931 (2005). 127 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 714 (2d Cir. 2003) (same), rev’d onother grounds, 542 U .S. 426 (2004). 128 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trialof Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C .F.R. 918 (2002). 129 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U .S. 507 (2004). 130 Id. at 510-11. 
Because of these points, the Loving case has had and will continue to havea lasting effect on national security matters. Federal courts have relied on Loving in several important nationalsecurity cases. One court, for example, cited the decision in litigationregarding the conviction of Jonathan Pollard for being a spy for Israel.125Loving’s principles also have come up in litigation concerning ZachariasMoussaoui, who now has confessed to conspiring with the September 11thhijackers.126  Further, Loving has played a role in the litigation concerningJose Padilla, an American citizen whom the President ordered the militaryto hold as an enemy combatant.127 Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the President ordered theestablishment of “military commissions”--a form of military tribunal--to tryenemy detainees suspected of war crimes.128  The actual trials have not yetoccurred, but cases may arise that challenge the subject matter jurisdictionof the military commissions, their judicial composition, and the proceduresthat they use. If courts reach the merits of these cases, they are likely tolook at the broad language in Solorio, Edmond, and Scheffer for guidanceon these issues, even though these precedents concern courts-martial andnot military commissions. 2. Military Counterterrorism Cases In addition to these cases concerning courts-martial, the RehnquistCourt decided two very significant counterterrorism cases following theattacks*1136 of September 11, 2001. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,129  anAmerican citizen named Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was taken into militarycustody in Afghanistan and subsequently transferred to a navy brig in SouthCarolina, challenged the lawfulness of his detention by the U.S. military.130Five Justices, in two separate opinions, concluded that a congressionalauthorization to use force against the persons responsible for the September
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131 See id. at 517 (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., andKennedy & Breyer, JJ.) (“[W]e conclude that the [Authorization for Use of MilitaryForce] is explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals....”);see also id. at 589  (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the plurality that theFederal Government has power to detain those that the Executive Branchdetermines to be enemy combatants.”). 132 See id . at 533 (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., andKennedy & Breyer, JJ.) (“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking tochallenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of thefactual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’sfactual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”); see also id. at 553 (Souter, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although I think litigation of Hamdi’sstatus as an enemy combatant is unnecessary, the terms of the plurality’s remandwill allow Hamdi to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant, and heshould at the least have the benefit of that opportunity.”). 133 See id. at 550 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined byGinsburg, J.) (explaining that the government’s position that it did not have toprovide detainees with a  hearing was “apparently at odds with the militaryregulation, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees andOther Detainees, Army Reg. 190-8, ch. 1, §§ 1-5, 1-6 (1997)”). The militaryinexplicably had not followed this regulation when taking prisoners in Afghanistan.See id. at 550-51. 
11, 2001 attacks empowered the President to capture and detain enemycombatants, even if they are American citizens.131  But a majority,composed of a different set of Justices, concluded that the Fifth Amend-ment’s Due Process Clause required the military to give Hamdi a hearingat which he could contest whether he was in fact an enemy combatant (asopposed to a noncombatant, such as a traveler, tourist, or student whom themilitary had mistakenly captured).132 In this instance, by requiring the military to give Hamdi a hearing, theCourt departed from its usual practice of noninterference with the guardiansof national security. Yet, the interference was minor for three reasons. First,a joint service regulation already required the armed forces to afford ahearing to detainees who challenged their status.133  The decision thus didnot require the military to take any action that it had not already committeditself to take. Second, the hearing requirement did not pose a large burden on themilitary. The plurality said that Hamdi would bear the burden of proof atthe hearing and that the government could present hearsay evidence to
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134 See id. at 533-34 (plurality opinion) (“Hearsay...may need to be accepted asthe most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of theGovernment’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one andfair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.”) . 135 See Dep’t of Def., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary 1,http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050301csrt.pdf (last visited June 11,2006) (reporting that only twenty-two nonenemy combatants were found in 558reviews held from August 13, 2004 until March 1 , 2005). 136 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e understand  Congress’grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include theauthority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict....” (quoting Authoriza-tion for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat 224, 224(2001))). 137 See id. at 518 (“[T]he capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants,by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war.”’ (quotingEx parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30  (1942))). 138 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749(2006). 139 Id. at 43. 140 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386  (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1649(2006). 141 Id. at 388, 397. 
justify his detention. 134  Following these principles, the United Statessubsequently held “Combatant Status Review” hearings for several hundredprisoners captured in Afghanistan, releasing only a handful of theseprisoners.135 *1137 Third, although the Court required the military to afforddetainees a hearing, the plurality opinion in dicta expressed agreement withthe military on two important procedural principles. First, even though thequestion was not before the Court, the opinion said that detention of anenemy combatant can last for the duration of the relevant hostilities.136Second, the Court asserted that the President can try enemy combatants bymilitary commissions.137  These pronouncements likely will lead tononinterference with the government in future cases. The Hamdi case was important in lower court litigation prior to ChiefJustice Rehnquist’s death. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,138  the D.C. Circuitrelied in part on Hamdi in rejecting a detainee’s challenge to trial bymilitary commission.139  Similarly, in Padilla v. Hanft,140  the Fourth Circuitconcluded that the United States could detain an American citizen, capturedat O’Hare International Airport, as an enemy combatant.141  The govern-
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142 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 143 Id. at 484. 144 See id. (“We therefore hold that [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 confers on the DistrictCourt jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality oftheir detention a t the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”). 145 See D epartment of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations toAddress Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006,Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(e)) (providing, subject to certain exceptions, that “no court, justice, or judgeshall have jurisdiction to hear or consider--(1) an application for a writ of habeascorpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense atGuantanamo Bay, Cuba”). This legislation is commonly called the “Graham-LevinAmendment” after its Senate sponsors. See, e.g., Editorial, The President and theCourts, N.Y. T imes, Mar. 20, 2006 , at A22 (referring to the “Graham-LevinAmendment”). 146 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 . 147 See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that“non-resident aliens captured and detained pursuant to the [Authorization for Useof Military Force] and the President’s Detention Order have no viable constitutionalbasis to seek a writ of habeas corpus”). But see In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,355 F. Supp. 2d  443 , 463 (D.D .C. 2005) (reaching the contrary conclusion that“detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the fundamental right to due process of lawunder the Fifth Amendment”). 
ment’s initial victories in these cases showed that the lower courtsinterpreted Hamdi not to represent a major disruption of the government’shandling of the national security issues raised by terrorism. The other significant terrorism case, Rasul v. Bush,142  held that thefederal courts had jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions filed byor on behalf of the detainees held by the military at the U.S. Naval Base inGuantánamo Bay, Cuba.143  This decision was contrary to the government’sposition, and thus represents another rare example of the Rehnquist Court’sinterference with a guardian of national security. But the interference wasminor in two respects. First, the Court rested its decision solely onstatutory, not constitutional, grounds.144  Congress, as a result, could andsubsequently did pass legislation to remove federal habeas corpusjurisdiction over detainees at Guantanamo Bay.145  Second, the Courtlimited its conclusion to the question *1138 of jurisdiction; it did notindicate whether the detainees had federal rights that the federal courtscould vindicate.146  At least one lower court subsequently held thatdetainees do not have these federal rights.147  So as with the intelligenceagencies, the FBI, and the Customs Service, the Rehnquist Court largelykept its hands off of the military in national security cases. 
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148 See State Department Information Release, supra note 3 . 149 See Afghan B omb Wounds 5 G.I.’s, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2006, §  1, at 8(reporting that the United States has 18,000 troops in Afghanistan); Edward W ong,U.S. Forces in Big Assault Near Samarra, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2006, at A12(reporting that the United States has 133 ,000  troops in Iraq). 
II. Assessment Perhaps the simplest way to assess the Rehnquist Court’s practice of notinterfering with the guardians of national security is to consider separatelyits apparent benefits and its apparent costs. As the following discussion willshow, on balance, the positive consequences appear to have outweighed thenegative. A. Benefits of the Practice of Noninterference The Rehnquist Court’s noninterference with the government in nationalsecurity cases appears to have had two general benefits. First, it probablyenhanced national security by allowing the government officials andinstitutions most competent in the subject of national security to decidehow to make the nation safer from external threats. Second, it insulated theSupreme Court from the kinds of criticism and controversy that the Courthas experienced in comparable areas--such as public safety--where theCourt has exercised greater supervision of government actions. 1. Enhancing National Security The United States faces many threats to its national security. It has poorrelations with nations, like Iran and North Korea, that have or may soonhave nuclear weapons.148  It has large numbers of armed forces in danger-ous locations around the world, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.149  And asrecent experience has shown, it faces the possibility of horrific terroristattacks on its own soil. Governmental decisions can improve or worsen national security. Putsimply, some courses of action might make the country and its citizenssafer, while others might make them less safe. Consider, for example, theUnited *1139 States’ relations with North Korea. Should the United Statesprovide conditional aid to the North Korean government to entice it topursue less bellicose policies? Or should the United States withhold aid andthreaten sanctions or military action unless North Korea gives up weaponsdevelopment? The choice is not obvious (at least to a nonexpert), but it isclearly important. A bad decision may lead to a nuclear war that a gooddecision might avoid. 
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150 No known empirical evidence answers this question. And the stakes aresurely too  high to conduct an experiment. 
The Constitution and legislation divide responsibility for makingdecisions about national security among different governmental units,including Congress, the President, and various federal agencies. Thesegovernmental units adopt and implement numerous policies designed tomake the country safer. They decide what foreign policies to pursue, howbest to protect classified information, what intelligence gathering efforts touse, and so forth. A basic question then arises about whether judicial oversight of theseguardians of national security would improve or impair national secu-rity--that is, whether the substantive involvement of judges would make thecountry more or less safe from external threats. In most cases, it stands toreason,150  the governmental units responsible for making national securitydecisions will do a better job than the courts could expect to do. In general,agencies that specialize in protecting national security, such as the CIA andDOD, will have greater expertise in the area than the Supreme Court. Theseagencies also will have more information. And they will have a greaterincentive not to make mistakes because, lacking life tenure, the leaders ofthese agencies can be held accountable for their decisions. In this way, by generally not interfering with the guardians of nationalsecurity, the Rehnquist Court probably contributed to the safety of thenation. The extent of the benefit is undoubtedly impossible to measure. Butit is difficult to think of a possible reason that the nation might be lesssecure because of the Court’s practice of noninterference. Whetherimproving national security has come with other costs--such as enablinggovernmental abuses of individual rights--is a separate question consideredbelow. 2. Preserving the Reputation of the Supreme Court National security policy is a very controversial subject. Many peopleagree with decisions that the United States has made in the area, whileothers believe that the government has made serious wrong turns. But onething remarkably absent from public debate is placement of significantblame on the Rehnquist Court for perceived shortcomings in nationalsecurity policy. The reason that the Rehnquist Court avoided criticism of this kindshould be no mystery: as Part I of this Essay showed, the Rehnquist Courtalmost always deferred to the political branches on matters of national
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151 See, e .g., Harold J. Rothwax, Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice (1996)(setting forth a now classic condemnation of judicially led developments in thecriminal justice system). 
security. As a result, the political branches have received all of the creditfor the successes of their programs and policies, and all of the blame fortheir shortcomings. The Rehnquist Court did not have any substantivenational security policies of its own, and therefore it attracted no substan-tive criticism. *1140 By way of comparison, consider public safety issues such aspolice investigative practices, criminal procedures, prisoners’ rights, deathpenalty restrictions, and so forth. Just as with national security, manydisagreements have arisen about the wisdom of the current substantiveapproaches to these subjects. But the criticism does not fall exclusively onthe political branches. On the contrary, in the area of public safety, a greatdeal of criticism falls on the Supreme Court.151 Again, the reason is evident: the Supreme Court has faced morecriticism with respect to public safety issues because of its extensivesubstantive participation in the area. The Warren Court famously beganreworking criminal laws and procedures from start to finish. Although theBurger and Rehnquist Courts differed considerably from the Warren Court,they continued to interfere with governmental law enforcement policies. Asa result, the Supreme Court could never avoid controversy and blame. The Rehnquist Court, in all likelihood, would have found itselfembroiled in similar controversy if it had not taken its hands-off approachto national security. By deferring to the guardians of national security, theCourt avoided this potential storm. Thus, the Court’s practice of non-interference in matters of national security both improved the safety of thenation and benefited the Court as an institution. B. Costs of the Practice of Noninterference A question separate from the benefits of the Rehnquist Court’snoninterference with the guardians of national security is whether theCourt’s approach came at a price. As a theoretical matter, the executive andlegislative branches, if unchecked by the judicial branch, could abuseindividual rights or commit other misdeeds in the name of national security.But this possible negative consequence does not appear to have occurredto any significant extent during the nineteen-year period of the RehnquistCourt. 
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152 See Rehnquist, supra  note 8 , at 40-58, 170-83, 184-202. 153 See id . 154 Looking just at the Supreme Court’s docket does not provide a  completepicture of what is happening in the country. A policy of noninterference by theSupreme Court theoretically might encourage misbehavior that does not reach thecourts. For example, once the CIA knows that the courts will not overturn itspersonnel actions, it may treat its officials and employees less fairly. But evidenceis lacking for the proposition that more misbehavior actually occurred during theRehnquist Court era or that the Court’s policy of noninterference created any ofthese negative repercussions. 
1. Abdication of the Court’s Duty to Protect Individual Rights We know from history that promoting national security may come at theexpense of individual rights. In his book, All the Laws but One, ChiefJustice Rehnquist describes government excesses during the Civil War,World War I, and World War II.152  During these prior conflicts, the federalgovernment locked up thousands of citizens, sometimes without criminalcharges, a trial, or even a characterization as the enemy. 153This unfortunate history, however, cannot justify condemnation of theRehnquist Court’s practice of noninterference in national security cases fortwo reasons. First, an era of the Supreme Court should be judged by thedecisions that the Court actually made during the era, not by decisions thatit might have made. In this regard, the Rehnquist Court existed at afortunate *1141 time in our history. From 1986 to 2005, the SupremeCourt’s docket did not include cases involving extreme national securitypolicies of the kind Chief Justice Rehnquist described in his book. Becausethe Rehnquist Court was not asked to review governmental policies of thiskind, its practice of noninterference did not have major negative impacts onindividual rights. In other words, even if a possible consequence of a policyof noninterference might be an abdication of the Court’s duty to protectindividual rights, this possible consequence did not occur.154 Second, predictions about what the Rehnquist Court might have doneif extreme cases had come before it cannot rest solely on what the Court didin the more moderate cases that it actually considered. Even if theRehnquist Court had taken a more active role in supervising the govern-ment in the national security cases described above, we cannot know forcertain what the Rehnquist Court would have done if a national crisis hadprompted the government to act as it did during past wars. Indeed, in hisbook, Chief Justice Rehnquist hypothesized that political leaders and courts
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155 See Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 224 (“There is no reason to think that futurewartime presidents will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, or thatfuture Justices of the Supreme Court will decide questions differently from theirpredecessors.”) . 156 See id . at 225  (“[I]t is both desirable and likely that more careful attentionwill be paid by the courts to the basis for the government’s claims of necessity asa basis for curtailing civil liberty.”). 157 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 158 Id. at 708. 159 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 160 Id. at 323-24. 
realistically cannot be expected to stand in the way of actions legitimatelytaken to protect national security in times of emergency.155 2. Enabling Post Hoc Rationalizations Another potential problem with deferring in all cases involving nationalsecurity is that it creates a great temptation for the government to usenational security as a justification for all of its actions. If the governmentknows that the Court defers when it cites national security, the governmentmay be tempted to cite national security in cases that do not actuallyconcern it. Just as patriotism is the last refuge of every scoundrel, nationalsecurity is an argument that the government will pull out in litigation whenall else has failed. In his book, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed hope that courts can atleast distinguish actual cases of national security from others.156  Fortu-nately, the Rehnquist Court was usually able to distinguish real nationalsecurity matters from those somewhat further afield. Two cases illustratethis point. In Clinton v. Jones, 157 the President argued that the federalcourts should not hear a sexual harassment claim against him based in parton national security *1142 concerns.158  In Boos v. Barry,159  the mayor ofWashington, D.C., sought to justify a ban on protests in front of foreignembassies in Washington on grounds of national security.160  In both cases,the Rehnquist Court saw through the government’s national securityarguments, perceiving possible inconvenience to the country but no actualdanger. But at least one questionable national security argument may haveslipped through. In upholding race-based affirmative action in admissionsat the University of Michigan Law School, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger
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161 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 162 See id. at 331 (“[H]igh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of theUnited States military assert that...a highly qualified, racially diverse officercorps...is essential to ...national security.” (quotation omitted)). 163 See id . at 330-33. 164 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1290 (4th ed. 1976)(defining a “legacy” as “something received (as from an ancestor or predecessor)resembling or suggestive of a gift by will”). 
161 cited national security as one ground for its decision.162  Reliance onnational security to justify preferences at an elite law school seems a littlefar-fetched. But probably the Court would have reached the same conclu-sion even if it had omitted all assertions about national security; the Courtcited national security as merely one of a number of other reasons forbelieving that the government could have an interest in promoting racialdiversity in university admissions.163  Therefore, even if the Court erred inthis respect, the error had no consequences. III. Concluding Thoughts on the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court The Symposium in which this Essay appears concerns the legacy of theRehnquist Court. A legacy is something transmitted by a predecessor.164  Sowhat did the Rehnquist Court bequeath to the Roberts Court? TheRehnquist Court did not create general doctrines of deference that theRoberts Court must follow. On the contrary, as the description of the casesabove shows, the Rehnquist Court simply found one way or another toavoid interfering with the guardians of national security in the various casesit faced. But this Essay suggests that the Rehnquist Court did give the RobertsCourt something important. It passed on evidence, in the form of experi-ence, that noninterference in national security matters can serve the Courtwell as an institutional matter. So long as the government does not actabusively, allowing the political branches to decide how to respond tonational security threats provides better protection for the nation and avoidsembroiling the Court in controversy. What the Rehnquist Court could not ensure is that the Roberts Courtwill share its good fortune of not facing extreme excesses by the govern-ment. The Roberts Court may or may not be so lucky. Perhaps greateremergencies will face the United States and the government will take farmore controversial measures in response. Just as we do not know what the
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165 In the first significant national security case to  come before it, the RobertsCourt did not follow the Rehnquist Court’s general practice of noninterference. Itenjoined the military’s use of certain tribunals (called “military commissions”) totry suspected terrorists as unauthorized by statute or the laws of war. See Hamdanv. Rumsfeld, 126 S . Ct. 2749 (2006). 
Rehnquist *1143 Court might have done in such circumstances, only timewill tell with the Roberts Court.165
